Cost Benefit Analysis of Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflic

Cost Benefit Analysis of Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflict GIVEN THE RECENT PROLIFERATION OF INTRASTATE CONFLICT, THE bureau OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. HOWEVER, THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE OFTEN ATTRIBUTED TO MILITARY FORMS OF INTERVENTION MAY HAVE SEVERE cost FOR BOTH THE TARGET OF INTERVENTION AND THE STATE CHOOSING TO INTERVENE. PAST LITERATURE HAS FOCUSED ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH INTERVENTION WITHOUT PROPERLY EVALUATING THE REASONS WHY A THIRD-PARTY CHOOSES TO gift MILITARY RESOURCES TO SUCH ENDEAVORS. THIS STUDY WILL EXAMINE BOTH THE RELATIVE CAPABILITIES OF THE ACTORS INVOLVED, AND THE STATED REASONS FOR INTERVENTION, IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISCOVER WHAT SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES CAUSE war-ridden FORMS OF INTERVENTION. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IS EMPLOYED BY THIRD PARTIES AND IS ASSUMED TO DICTATE THE WAY IN WHICH INTERVENTION TAKES PLACE. ULTIMATELY, THE MATERIAL INTERESTS OF TH E INTERVENER SEEM TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT office staff IN THE DECISION TO TAKE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IN A TARGET STATE. IntroductionSince the conclusion of World War II, the nature of military appointment has been dominated by clashes between internal state actors. Indeed, as much as 80 percent of the wars and casualties since World War II have been caused by internal conflicts (David 1997). Each day the world is presented with a tragic loss of life connected with the instability of sovereign states. In the six-day period between October eighth and October 13th of 2003, the Wall Street Journal reported a disturbing set of events. Tribal fighters in the Congo shot and hacked to death 65 civilians a car bomb in Bogot, Colombia, killed at least six people... ...t should provide a basis for drawing conclusions with regard to the decision-making criteria for an intervening state. 4 While I richly recognize that the distinction between 1000 and 1001 troops is problematic, I believe th is threshold better captures the distinction between aggressive and passive intervention than the 5000 or 10,000 troop thresholds. This is the best option given the distinctions offered by the available data.5 The number of naval vessels involved in these activities is ignored because the distinction between 4 and 5 vessels that is offered by the data is unhelpful for the distinction between passive and aggressive intervention.6 In order to avoid using a zero as contribution of the scale, I have automatically given each case one point.7 See Operationalization of the Independent Variables for a description of the scale created.